The Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) is in accordance with § 23 Atomic Energy Act, the responsibilities of the establishment and operation of federal facilities for the safekeeping and disposal of radioactive waste. For the Konrad mine is since May 2002 before the zoning approval for the construction of a repository. By decree of 30.5.2007, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety BfS commissioned to carry out the conversion of the Konrad mine into a repository for radioactive waste with negligible heat generation. In connection with the establishment of the above-ground building (rebuilding, renovation or new construction) of the surface installations Konrad 1 and 2 are the requirements of the guideline for sustainable building (plant for RBBau), the Energy Conservation Act and the so-called. Meseberg decisions of the Federal Government, 5.12.2007 be taken into account. For consultation and review of the implementation of these requirements, the BfS requires professionally competent assistance of external expertise. The overall task is divided for the surface installations Konrad 1 and 2 Konrad on building specific. As part of processing the following activities / services are provided: - Advice on implementation of ecological building requirements in the detailed design including attending meetings - examination of design documents and tender documents (Preliminary, specifications, specifications) - making recommendations on products (product testing. ) and creation of declaration lists for individual trades - construction site control.
For the Konrad mine the zoning approval for the construction of a repository has been available since 05.22.2002. By decree of 30.05.2007 the BMUB has instructed the BfS to carry out the conversion of the Konrad mine into a repository for radioactive waste with negligible heat generation.
The plans for the Konrad repository and the results of safety analyzes were summarized in the plan "radioactive waste repository Konrad Salzgitter" Konrad. By the end of the planning approval process, the state of science and technology (S & T) as well as the rules and regulations was (particularly the revision of the Radiation Protection Ordinance in 2001) considered regularly.
Based on the approval authority has established with the participation of experts in 2002 that the necessary financial security is ensured against damages resulting from the disposal of radioactive waste in accordance with the then current state of S & T.
As a responsible operator, the BfS sees a duty to a "review of the safety requirements of the Konrad repository according to the state of science and technology" (ÜsiKo) carried out before commissioning.
The BfS is based on high principles of transparency, accountability, openness and an independent review.
The ÜsiKo consists entirely of the following phases:
1. Determination of the verification needs;
2. If necessary, updating of Safety analyzes;
3. If necessary adaptation planning;
4. If necessary implementation under construction.
When ÜsiKo all safety analyzes for the Konrad repository are considered in the previous steps. This concerns the following aspects:
- long-term safety;
- accident analyzes;
- the intended operation;
- thermal influence of the host rock.
The aim of the assessment is to evaluate the stock specific evidence of the application documents for approval procedures according to § 6 AtG for new permit the storage of nuclear fuel in SZL Brunsbüttel in order to meet the permit conditions.
The nuclear power plant Brunsbüttel GmbH & Co. oHG filed an application for a permit pursuant to § 6 AtG regarding the storage of nuclear fuels in transport and storage casks of the CASTOR V / 52 in-site interim storage (SSL) Brunsbüttel. During the audit, the approval requirement by the BFS evaluating the effects of a targeted air crash is required. The assessment to be carried out includes the determination of the radiological consequences of analog SEWD calculation basis for a targeted air crash on the SSL Brunsbüttel. The assessment encompasses the modeling of all relevant scenarios and processes as a result of targeted air crash (development of evaluation criteria, selection of transport aircraft and impact parameters, mechanical and thermal impacts, building and container behavior under mechanical and thermal effects, modeling, if necessary, under stellender releases, identifying radiological consequences).
As part of this deliverables a concept plan for the complete retrieval of waste from ELK 8a on the 511-m level the Asse II is to be made. Here, the intra-day processes and systems for the retrieval of radioactive waste from the ELK 8a on the 511-m level, including all required radiation protection measures to plan conceptually. This includes all processes and systems, including the requisite infrastructure and infrastructure areas, in particular: - the recovery of all packaging waste and waste from the ELK 8a on the 511-m level, - the security, stabilization and the subsequent filling of the vacated storage chamber and the necessary infrastructure facilities, - it is to speculate, demonstrating that the necessary mining measures the risk of solution inflow and its radiological consequences not increase (no relevant deterioration of the security level), - to carry out necessary measurements on the recovered waste for radiological characterization for the planned operational handling, - the clearance measurement of uncontaminated materials, resulting from the excavation or salvage, - the outside contamination-free packaging of the recovered waste for transportation, - the transport of packaged waste in the mine to the shaft, - the transfer of the packaged waste to skip the hoisting plant (underground), - unloading of the packaged waste out of the lift cage and the movement to a container on the premises transport supply location (for further transport in a buffer stock). The entire planning work for the retrieval of radioactive waste from the ELK 8a on the 511-m level are basically aligned to the technical and legal requirements and the associated mining, operational and radiation protection constraints.